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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court for consideration of this Appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the trial court's grant of an
injunction against the Plaintiffs/Appellants (the "Owners"), enjoining the Owners from
interfering with the Defendant/Appellee's ("Wendy's5') sole and exclusive use of the
Owners' property? In making this determination the Utah Supreme Court gives no
deference to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and reviews the decision for
correctness. Hansen v. Eyre, 116 P.3d 290, 292 (Utah 2005).
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' decision is found at 2007 UT App 211; 580 Utah Adv. Rep.
13. A foil copy of the opinion is included in the Appendix to this Brief.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no statutory provisions which are controlling or determinative of this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Owners ask the Utah Supreme Court to find that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming an injunction issued by the Third District Court.
The case was filed by the Owners in the Third District Court on claims of Trespass
and Breach of contract. Wendy's answered the Owners' Complaint and filed a
1

Counterclaim seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. On Wendy's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court granted the motion and enjoined the Owners from taking any
action that would interfere with Wendy's continued use of Drive-Through Facilities
located on the Owners' property. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that
portions of the trial court's summary judgment decision were incorrect and remanded the
matter for proceedings on those portions of the case. However, the Court of Appeals also
held that the Owners' trespass and breach of contract claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, and that the injunction requested by Wendy's in its counterclaim, and issued
by the trial court, was proper. The effect of the ruling of the Court of Appeals is to vest
Wendy's with the sole and exclusive use of the Owners' property. Owners are enjoined
from any further use of the drive-through property at issue. A Statement of Relevant
Facts of the Case follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant/Appellee Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York,

Inc. ("Wendy's") owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah (the "Wendy's Property"), on which is located a restaurant building and related
improvements. R. at 119, ^ 1.
2.

The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the

"Shopping Center"), which is owned by Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Owners"). R. at 119, t 2 .
3.

Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the

property described in a Declaration, which was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake
2

County Recorder on September 24, 1982 as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page
823. R. at 119,13.
4.

The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the

property described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration
refers to as "Parcel Three." R. at 119, f 5.
5.

The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant in or

about 1982. R. at 120, | 6 .
6.

At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's

Property in or about 1982, a drive-through lane was also constructed on the north side of
the Wendy's Property. The drive-through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow,
landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the
drive-through lane and related island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive-Through
Facilities"). Rat 120,17.
7.

The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the

restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto the Owners' property.
R. at 80,1 11.
8.

The Owners' property which is encumbered by the Drive-Through

Facilities is identified in the Declaration as a portion of the "Common Area" of the
Shopping Center. R. at 80, Tf 11.
9.

The Declaration contains an Exhibit A, referred to as the Plot Plan. The

Plot Plan is a proposed site plan for the Canyon Rim Shopping Center. R. at 79, f 6.
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10.

The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines

running from the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to
the northeast. R. at 7.
11.

With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building

featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three,
except as shown on the Plot Plan . . . ." R. at 38.
12.

The physical relationship between the location of the Wendy's building and

the Drive-Through Facilities as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with the
physical location of the Wendy's building and Drive-Through Facilities as physically
located on the ground. R. at 280, f 8.
13.

The Wendy's building, as built, begins approximately 8 feet farther from

the North edge of the 33rd South right-of-way and is approximately 13 feet longer than
the building shown on the Plot Plan. R. at 280, f 9.
14.

With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that:
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign."
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written
approval of all Owners . . . .
R. at 39, 40.

15.

In November, 2002, Wendy's became aware that the Drive-Through

Facilities then being operated by Burger King encroached upon Owners' property
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through a survey commissioned by Wendy's and performed by Larsen & Malmquist. R.
at 151,13; 261,11.
16.

Shortly thereafter a representative of Wendy's contacted Mark Papanikolas,

a representative of the Owners, to inquire about purchasing an easement over Owners'
property. R. at 261,12.
17.

In December, 2002, Owners notified Wendy's that Owners would not allow

drive-through facilities to be located on Owners' property without compensation being
paid to Owners. R. at 261,13.
18.

On or about February 28, 2003, Wendy's purchased the Burger King

Restaurant property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and converted
the restaurant from a Burger King to a Wendy's. R. at 262,14.
19.

Following the purchase by Wendy's of the Burger King properly, Wendy's

replaced the Burger King free-standing signs and added additional free-standing and
monument signs, at least one of which is alleged to have been constructed on Owners'
property. R. at 262,15; 287.
20.

Wendy's is currently maintaining the Drive-Through Facilities and

landscaped area as shown on the Larsen & Malmquist survey to be on Owners' property
and has planted and continues to maintain flowers, shrubs and grass on Owners' property,
together with one of Wendy's signs. R. at 262,16.
2L

In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the

Wendy's Property, and a directional sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities,
5

Wendy's also constructed two additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (the
"Menu-Board Signs"). R. at 254, f 5, 283,ffif8-9.
22.

In July, 2004, Owners filed suit against Wendy's alleging trespass and

breach of contract based on the location of Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities on
Owners' property. R. at 1.
23.

Wendy's answered Owners' Complaint and filed a Counterclaim that

included a request for an injunction. R. at 14.
24.

Wendy's brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on Owners' claims and

on Wendy's counterclaims on September 30, 2005. R. at 114.
25.

A hearing was held on Wendy's motion on December 12, 2005. R. at 306.

26.

On December 12, 2005, the Court entered a Minute Entry granting

Wendy's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Minute Entry the Court states:
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See
Utah Dep't of Envlt Quality v Redd, 2002 UT 50, H 16, 48
P.3d 230 {citing Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-1). While the
Plaintiffs' suggest the trespass is continuing, rather than
permanent and, therefore, their lawsuit is timely, the Court
disagrees. At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged
with concrete curbing, which is considerably more permanent
than the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which
constituted the act of trespass contested in Brieggar
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 1953, p.
11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the alleged
trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or about
1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time barred.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare
the appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for
consideration by the Court.
R. at 307.
27.

The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final

Judgment in this matter on March 21, 2006. R. at 375.
28.

The Court of Appeals entered its final decision on June 21, 2007. A copy of

the decision of the Court of Appeals is included in the appendix to this Petition.
29.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals states:
^}28 Although, "[i]n addition to damages, [a] plaintiff may
seek to stop the conduct that is creating the trespass," and
although "issuance of an injunction to remove the
encroachment remains discretionary with the court," 9
Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 64A.05[8]
(Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2007), the question here is whether
an equitable remedy of removal is still available after the
statute of limitations has run. The parties do not cite, and we
do not find, any Utah law directly on point. In at least one
state, however, courts have held that requests for injunctive
relief for the removal of permanent trespasses on property are,
like trespass claims, barred by the three-year statute of
limitations. See Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr.
49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Troeger v. Fink, 332
P.2d 779, 782, 783 (Ca. Ct. App. 1958) (stating that "causes
of action for damages and for injunctive relief accrue when
the [permanent] trespass is committed and are barred three
years thereafter" and that "[gjenerally, the running of an
applicable statute of limitations will also bar equitable
relief).
TJ29 This approach makes sense. After all, the three-year
statute of limitations bars any trespass "action." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot assert the
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trespass action that would support their remedy - regardless
of whether that remedy is equitable or is for damages.
1J30 Even if this were not the case, the Utah Supreme Court
has held that "[e]quitable claims will be barred after the time
fixed by the analogous statute of limitations unless
extraordinary circumstances make the application unjust."
CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37,1[11, 24 P.3d 966;
see also Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096, 1101
(1915) ("Generally, in the state courts, the statute of
limitations applies to equitable as well as legal actions.").
207 UTApp 21 l , t f 28-30.
30.

The Owners filed a Petition for Certiorari on July 23, 2007, and this Court

subsequently granted the Owners' Petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case sustained the injunction issued
by the trial court. This decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with prior precedent
of this Court. The decision allows Wendy's to continue its sole and exclusive use of
Owners' property, despite the fact that Wendy's has no ownership interest in the
property. This is contrary to the policy set forth by this Court in Nyman v. Anchor
Development, L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is also incorrect because it awarded
affirmative relief to Wendy's on its Counterclaim in the form of an injunction prior to
any determination on the merits that would support the injunction.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN THIS CASE
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS
WITH PRIOR PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT.
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals found that the injunction issued by
the trial court was proper. The Court reached this result through reliance on case law from
the State of California which holds that requests for injunctive relief for the removal of
permanent trespasses on property are, like the trespass claims, barred by the same statute
of limitations. See Papanikolas v. Wendy's, 207 UT App. 211, ^ 28-29. As a result of
that decision, the trial court's Order, which prevents the Owners from taking any action
which would inhibit Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities, has been sustained.
It is undisputed that Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities is completely
exclusive of any use the Owners could make of their own property. Therefore, the
injunctive order issued by the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, has
created a situation where Wendy's has the sole and exclusive use and possession of the
Owners' property. They have obtained this right despite the absence of any legal
ownership interest in the property and despite the fact the Court of Appeals specifically
declined to address the issue of whether or not the Declaration in this case authorizes
Wendy's trespass. See Papanikolas v. Wendy's, 207 UT App. 211, f 20.
The aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals, granting Wendy's the sole
and exclusive use of Owners' property, is contrary to the decision of this Court in Nyman
9

v. Anchor Development, LLC,

2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357. In Nyman, a property owner

sought a judgment of adverse possession or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement
where he had constructed his garage partially on a neighbor's property. This Court denied
the appellant's claim to a prescriptive easement on the basis that the appellant's proposed
use was exclusive of the primary owner's use of the property. The opinion of this Court
states:
The trial court also rejected Nyman 's alternative argument that
even if he is not entitled to adverse possession of the disputed
portion of Lot 17, he has a right to a prescriptive easement
allowing him to continue to use the property for his garage.
The trial court held that Nyman's claimed right could not be
construed as an easement because it would leave Miller, the
holder of record title, with no rights at all in the disputed
property. Nyman argues that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment to Miller on this issue.
f 18 "A prescriptive easement is created when the party
claiming the prescriptive easement can prove that 'use of
another's land was open, continuous, and adverse under a
claim of right for a period of twenty years.' " Here, the term
"use" implies an inherent distinction in the property rights
conferred by an easement, on the one hand, and outright
ownership, on the other. "A prescriptive easement does not
result in ownership, but allows only use of property belonging
to another for a limited purpose." Mar chant v. Park City, 111
P.2d 677, 681 (Utah Ct.App.1989), affd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah
1990). Thus, we have previously observed that:
Whenever there is ownership of property subject to an
easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of which must
be respected and kept in balance. On the one hand, it is to be
realized that the owner of the fee title, because of his general
ownership, should have the use and enjoyment of his property
to the highest degree possible, not inconsistent with the
easement. On the other, the owner of the easement should
likewise have the right to use and enjoy his easement to the
10

fullest extent possible not inconsistent with the rights of the
fee owner.
N. Union Canal Co. v. Newell 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah
1976). Maintaining such a balance between the rights of the
fee title owner and a purported easement holder becomes
impossible where the latter asserts a right to permanent
exclusive occupancy of the fee title owner's land. We
conclude that the right to keep a garage on another's property
falls outside the scope of a prescriptive easement, and
therefore the latter is simply unavailable to Nyman as an
alternative in this case. Indeed, we know of no prior Utah case
recognizing a prescriptive easement right to maintain a
permanent structure on someone else's property.
Nyman, 2003 UT 27, f 17-18, 73 P.3d 357, 361-362. The Court of Appeals decision in
this case creates the precise result which this Court found untenable in Nyman: Wendy's
has the exclusive use and possession of the enclosed drive-through property at issue
while the Owners, still with "legal title" to the property, are excluded from any use of the
property whatsoever.
The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on the notion that where a statute of
limitations bars a legal action, it also bars the Owner from taking any action to recover its
property. Papanikolas, 2007 UT App. 211, f28-30. The injunction was sustained without
any determination by the Court of Appeals on the merits of Wendy's claim of a right to
continue in sole possession of the property. Despite the fact that Wendy's has alleged a
cause of action seeking a prescriptive easement in its counterclaim and essentially
abandoned that claim, the Court of Appeals decision vests the sole and exclusive use of
the Owners' property in Wendy's wholly on the basis of a statute of limitations
determination. In short, as a result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Owners
11

are the owners of property from which they are completely excluded, and Wendy's is in
exclusive possession of property it does not own. This result is in direct conflict with the
decision of this Court in Nyman.
The Court's emphasis in Nyman on the permanent nature of the encroachment is
highlighted in this case. The designation of the Drive-Through Facilities here as a
"permanent" trespass is significant. The Court of Appeals explained the distinction
between "permanent" trespass and "ongoing" trespass, noting that "the act of
constructing the Drive-Through Facilities was permanent in that "[its] installation
amountfed] to a single act with a single impact on the land," Papanikolas, 2007 UT App
211, f25. The Court of Appeals' reasoning rests on the fact that once an act of permanent
trespass is committed, there is no further contact of an interfering nature with the land.
The underlying owner is no longer impacted in its use of the property. Given this
distinction, it is difficult to understand why an owner should be prohibited from using
self-help to restore its property to its pre-trespass condition. The Court of Appeals
decision in this case would have prohibited the property owner in Brieggar Properties,
L.C. v. KE. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 1133,1 from removing the
offending pile of rocks and debris from his property. This result is unwarranted. The
Court of Appeals decision on this point should be reversed.

1

In Brieggar, the offending trespass was a pile of rocks and other construction debris that
was mistakenly placed on Brieggar's property. The trespassing party mistakenly dumped
the material, believing that Brieggar's property belonged to someone else.
12

II.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
IMPROPERLY GRANTS AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF TO
WENDY'S ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
On certiorari review, this Court will review the decision of the Court of Appeals
for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's
decision under the correct standard of review. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366.
In the context of a Summary Judgment Motion, it is the obligation of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to view the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, here, the Owners. Id.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the primary portion of the trial
court's ruling when it determined that Owners' trespass and breach of contract claims
were time barred. However, Wendy's request for an injunction is founded on the
allegations of its Counterclaim, which asserts a right to the current location of the DriveThrough Facilities based on the terms of the Declaration. The record in this case reveals
no dispute of fact on the issue of Wendy's encroachment on the Owners' property. R. at
261, ff 1-2. At the very least, the facts, taken in a light most favorable to the Owners,
indicate the existence of a genuine dispute of fact as the whether or not the Drive
Through Facilities of Wendy's are consistent with the Declaration. R. at 280, ^8.
Therefore, in the context of Wendy's Summary Judgment Motion on which this matter
was decided, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were precluded by the record from
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concluding that Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities were located in a manner that is
consistent with the Declaration.
In support of its decision to sustain the Injunction, the Court of Appeals noted that
"the question here is whether an equitable remedy of removal is still available after the
statute of limitations has run." Papanikolas, 2007 UT App 211, ^28. The Court then
relied on a decision from California and held that because equitable relief should likewise
be barred by the same statute of limitations applicable to damages actions, the trial
court's injunction should be sustained. The Court of Appeals' decision rests on the
incorrect assertion that the Owners were seeking equitable relief to authorize removal of
the encroachment. In fact, the only injunction at issue before the trial court or the Court
of Appeals was the injunction issued by the trial court on Wendy's request. Owners'
request for equitable relief in the matter was not before the Court.
As noted above, the state of the record in this case prevented any determination
that Wendy's was not trespassing on Owners' property. Additionally, because the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the statute of limitations, the Court of
Appeals stated:
[2] \ 20 We do not reach the issue of whether the trial court
correctly interpreted the Declaration, as we agree with the
trial court that Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract
claims concerning the Drive-Through Facilities are timebarred.
Papanikolas, 2007 UT 211, ^f 20. Therefore, without any judgment on the merits of the
breach of contract claim, the trial court awarded the affirmative relief requested by
14

Wendy's in its Counterclaim. The use of the statute of limitations in this way was legally
incorrect. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated the law in this manner:
It is the general rule of wide application that the statute of
limitations is available in judicial proceedings only as a
defense and can never be asserted by a plaintiff as a cause of
action in him or as conferring upon him an affirmative right
of action. The principle has sometimes been expressed in the
figure of speech that the statute is available only as a shield,
not as a sword.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 277 F.2d 615, 623-624 (10th Cir. 1960). The
affirmative relief granted to Wendy's was awarded without any determination of the
merits and therefore, the injunction issued by the trial court was incorrectly sustained by
the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals' decision rests on faulty
reasoning and an incorrect understanding of the claims of the parties. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals in this matter determined that Wendy's trespass is permanent. The
characterization of the trespass as permanent implies a single entry, and a single impact
on the property. There is, according to this characterization, no ongoing interference with
the Owners' use of the property. If the reasoning behind the characterization were
accurate, the Owner would be entitled to, and able to fully use and enjoy the property.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, while characterizing the trespass as
permanent, precludes the Owners from any use of their own property and awards the sole
and exclusive use of the property to Wendy's. This is contrary to any reasoned policy.
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The decision also affirms an injunction awarded to Wendy's on its counterclaim
without any determination that the counterclaim has merit. The injunction was based
solely on the Court of Appeals determination that Owners' trespass and breach of
contract claims are barred by the statute of limitations. It turns the statute from a shield to
a sword which affords affirmative relief. The decision is also erroneous on this point and
should be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, Owners request that this Court overturn that part of the
Court of Appeals' decision which upholds the injunction issued by the trial court and
remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the merits of the parties'
remaining claims. The Owners further request an Order awarding them their costs as
allowed by law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ~

day of December, 2007.

MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thej?

day of December, 2007,1 caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing by mailing, postage prepaid, first-class United
States mail, to the following:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
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BILLINGS, Judge:
1|l
Plaintiffs Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, L.C. and White
Investment Co., Inc. appeal the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Defendant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New
York, Inc. (Wendy's). On appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial
court erred in interpreting the declaration of restrictions and
grant of easements and in concluding that the statutes of
limitations had run on Plaintiffs1 breach of contract and
trespass claims. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in
part.
BACKGROUND1

1. "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we . . . view the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party."
Sanders v. Leavitt,
2001 UT 78,1(1 n.l, 37 P.3d 1052. "We recite the facts
accordingly."
Id.

f2
Plaintiffs and Wendy's are adjacent land owners in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Plaintiffs own the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the
Shopping Center), and Wendy's owns property next to the Shopping
Center (the Wendy's Property), on which it owns and operates a
fast-food restaurant.
i|3
Both the Shopping Center and the Wendy's Property are
located on land parcels described in a declaration of
restrictions and grants of easements (the Declaration) recorded
in 1982. The Declaration describes three distinct land parcels.
The Declaration states that Plaintiffs own parcels one and two.
The Wendy's Property is located within parcel three.
^4
The Wendy's Property was originally developed in 1982 as a
Burger King restaurant. Wendy's purchased the property in early
2003 and converted the Burger King restaurant to a Wendy's
restaurant (the Restaurant).
UB
The original development of the Wendy's Property in 1982
included construction of a drive-through lane on the north side
of the Wendy's Property. As constructed, the drive-through lane
was bound on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged with
concrete curbing and on the south by the Restaurant (we refer to
the drive-through lane and the related island as the DriveThrough Facilities).
f6
The Declaration limits the construction of buildings with
drive-through traffic on parcel three, allowing such construction
only when certain conditions are satisfied. Specifically, the
Declaration states that
[n]o building featuring drive-in, drive-up or
drive-through traffic shall be located on
[p]arcel [tjhree, except as shown on the
[p]lot [p]Ian [(the Plot Plan)], without the
prior written consent of the [ojwner of
[p]arcel [t]wo and [the lessor of parcel
one], including consent to the location of
the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes
of such facility. Such consent will not be
unreasonably withheld provided that the
location of such lanes and the use thereof do
not impede or inhibit access to and from and
the conduct of business from the buildings in
the Shopping Center or access to and from the
adjacent streets.
H7
The parties agree that the Plot Plan details the DriveThrough Facilities as two curved lines running from the northwest
corner of the Restaurant to the northeast. They also agree that
the Restaurant and the Drive-Through Facilities have, since the
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time of their construction, remained in the same location and
configuration and have remained in continuous use.
i|8
In addition to the Restaurant and the Drive-Through
Facilities, there are also a number of signs located on parcel
three, including two pylon signs and two menu board signs (the
Menu Board Signs). The Menu Board Signs and one of the parcel
three pylon signs are located on the Wendy's Property. Although
menu board signs have continuously existed on the Wendy's
Property since 1982, Wendy's replaced one of the existing menu
board signs and installed an additional menu board sign when it
acquired the property in 2003. The Declaration limits the amount
and type of signage permitted on parcel three. Specifically, the
Declaration states that
[t]he [o]wner of [p] arcel [t]hree shall have
the right to construct two(2) free-standing
pylon, monument or other signs at the
location designated on the Plot Plan as
"Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon,
monument or other free-standing sign shall be
permitted on [p]arcel [tjhree without the
prior written approval of all [o]wners and
[the lessor of parcel one].
The Declaration also permits, without limit, the construction of
directional signs within the designated common areas of each
property parcel.
^9
In 2004, Plaintiffs filed suit against Wendy's for breach of
contract and trespass. In 2005, Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, alleging that the Menu Board Signs are not permitted
by the Declaration and therefore constitute a breach a contract;
that the Drive-Through Facilities are not physically located "as
shown on the Plot Plan" and therefore constitute a breach of
contract; and that the Drive-Through Facilities, and patrons'
continued use of those facilities, constitute a trespass.
Plaintiffs also subsequently asserted that Wendy's committed
trespass and breached the Declaration in maintaining landscaping
on the Drive-Through Facilities and in constructing a new fence
and sign on Plaintiffs' property. 2
^|10 Wendy's moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' cLaims.
The trial court granted Wendy's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that:
(1) the Drive-Through Facilities do not violate
the Declaration, and thus do not constitute a trespass, because
the Declaration "expressly authorizes [the] Drive[-]Through

2. The parties and the record do not make clear whether the
alleged fence and sign are located on the Drive-Through
Facilities or elsewhere on Plaintiffs' property.
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Facilities located on [p]arcel [t]hree as shown on the Plot
Plan"; (2) even if the Drive-Through Facilities constituted a
breach of contract or trespass, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by
the relevant statutes of limitations; and (3) the Menu Board
Signs do not violate the Declaration because the Declaration does
not explicitly prohibit the signs and, moreover, because the
Declaration expressly contemplates the operation of a drivethrough restaurant on parcel three, the Declaration must have
contemplated the erection of menu board signs--"an inherently
necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants." The
trial court thus denied Plaintiffs' claims for damages, awarded
Wendy's "a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Menu Board
Signs may remain in use in their present location and
configuration," and "enjoin[ed P]laintiffs from taking any action
to inhibit Wendy's from using and maintaining the Drive-Through
Facilities and the Menu Board Signs in their present location and
configuration." In accordance with a fee provision in the
Declaration, the trial court awarded costs and attorney fees to
Wendy's. The fee provision states that
[i]n the event that legal proceedings are
brought or commenced to enforce any of the
terms of th[e] Declaration against any
[o]wner or other party with an interest in
the Shopping Center, the successful party in
such action shall then be entitled to receive
and shall receive from the defaulting [ojwner
or party a reasonable sum as attorney [] fees
and costs, to be fixed by the court in the
same action.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
did not apparently consider Plaintiffs' claims concerning Wendy's
alleged maintenance of landscaping within the Drive-Through
Facilities and its purported installation of a new fence and sign
on Plaintiffs' property.
Ull

Plaintiffs appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

tl2 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erroneously granted
Wendy's motion for summary judgment because the court
misinterpreted the Declaration as a matter of law and misapplied
the statutes of limitations to Plaintiffs' breach of contract and
trespass claims. It is well established that "[s]ummary judgment
is appropriate only where (1) 'there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact' and (2) 'the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'" Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63,1(7,
147 P.3d 439 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
"In reviewing a
grant . . . of summary judgment, [we are] . . . obligated
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to . . . review the district court's legal conclusions, as well
as the grant of summary judgment as a whole, for correctness."
View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MS1C0 L.L.C. . 2005 UT 91,fl7, 12 7
P. 3d 697. The trial court's interpretation of the Declaration
and its application of the statutes of limitations constitute
legal conclusions. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn, 2003 UT
50,1|16, 84 P. 3d 1134 ("The trial court's interpretation of a
contract presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness.")/ Russell Packard Dev. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,^18,
108 P.3d 741 ("'The applicability of a statute of
limitations . . . [is a] question [] of law, which we review for
correctness.'" (quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,^32, 44 P. 3d
742)) .
ANALYSIS
1(13 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly granted
Wendy's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of
trespass and breach of contract. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim
that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
the Declaration permits the Menu Board Signs; that the DriveThrough Facilities do not violate the Declaration; and that the
Drive-Through Facilities do not constitute a trespass.
Plaintiffs also aver that the trial court incorrectly ruled that
Plaintiffs' contract and trespass claims concerning the DriveThrough Facilities are time-barred by the relevant statutes of
limitations, and that even if their trespass claim is timebarred, the trial court cannot prevent Plaintiffs from obtaining
equitable relief to remove the trespass from their property.
Plaintiffs further assert that the trial court erred in failing
to consider their claims of trespass and breach of contract
regarding the alleged maintenance of landscaping and the
construction of a new fence and sign on Plaintiffs' property.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly
interpreted the Declaration in awarding costs and attorney fees
to Wendy's.
I.

Menu Board Signs

^|l4 Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court erred in
determining as a matter of law that the Declaration permits the
Menu Board Signs. The Declaration provides:
The [o]wner of [p]arcel [t]hree shall have
the right to construct two(2) free-standing
pylon, monument or other signs at the
location designated on the Plot Plan as
"Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon,
monument or other free-standing sign shall be
permitted on [p]arcel [t]hree without the
prior written approval of all [o]wners
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Because the parties do not dispute that parcel three currently
contains two pylon signs, Plaintiffs contend that the Menu Board
Signs violate the Declaration in that they constitute "other
free-standing sign[s], n installed without prior written approval,
in excess of the number of signs permitted by the Declaration.
fl5 In contrast, Wendy's asserts that the Menu Board Signs do
not violate the Declaration because they are not the type of
signs prohibited under the Declaration. Specifically, Wendy's
contends that the Menu Board Signs are directional in nature and
thus not limited under the Declaration.
tl6 In determining that the Declaration does not prohibit the
Menu Board Signs, the trial court appeared to adopt Wendy's
classification of the Menu Board Signs as not constituting the
type of signs--i.e., "pylon, monument or other free-standing"-limited under the Declaration without prior written approval.
1|l7 In reviewing the Declaration, " [this court] interpret [s] the
provisions of the Declaration as we would a contract."
View
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C. , 2005 UT 91,1(21, 127 P.3d
697. In so doing, "the intention of the . . . parties is
controlling." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp. , 2002 UT 43,1|l8, 48
P.3d 918. Thus, " [i]f the language of the contract is
unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be determined as a
matter of law based on the language of the agreement."
Id. But,
" [i]f the contract is found to be ambiguous, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions."
Id.
Accordingly, "a motion for summary judgment may not be granted if
a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties
intended." Id. at Kl4 (quotations and citation omitted). "A
contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meaning of terms,
missing terms [,] or other facial deficiencies."
Id. at 1Jl9
(quotations and citations omitted). "To demonstrate ambiguity,
the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable."
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry , 8 02
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).
1|18 Unlike the trial court, we do not think the Declaration
clearly supports Wendy's position that the Menu Board Signs are
directional signs allowed under the Declaration. To the
contrary, the Declaration appears silent as to the parties'
intent regarding the classification and limitation of menu board
signs, and the agreement gives no indication as to why
Plaintiffs' position that the Menu Board Signs are of a
prohibited nature is not equally tenable. Because "[we] ha[ve]
determined that the [Declaration] is ambiguous and there are
issues of fact regarding the intention of the parties, summary
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judgment may not be granted based on contract interpretation."
Peterson, 2002 UT 43 at i|29; see also id. ("Because the meaning
of the contract ha[d] not yet been resolved, . . . the trial
court's reliance on one construction of it to support summary
judgment was improper."). Thus, we reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claims regarding the Menu Board Signs and remand for an
evidentiary hearing to determine what the parties to the
Declaration must have intended as to the signs. 3
II.

Drive-Through Facilities

fl9 Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in
determining as a matter of law that the Drive-Through Facilities
do not violate the Declaration and thus do not constitute a
trespass. Plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred in
deciding that Plaintiffs' contract and trespass claims concerning
the Drive-Through Facilities are time-barred.
^[2 0 We do not reach the issue of whether the trial court
correctly interpreted the Declaration, as we agree with the trial
court that Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract claims
concerning the Drive-Through Facilities are time-barred.
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims are time-barred because the
Drive-Through Facilities were constructed in 1982 and Plaintiffs
did not file their breach of contract action alleging the
facilities violated the Declaration until 2004, well beyond the
relevant statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-1223(2) (2002) ("An action may be brought within six years . . .
upon any contract.").
f21 Plaintiffs' trespass claims concerning the construction and
patrons' use of the Drive-Through Facilities are also timebarred. Under Utah law, "[a]n action may be brought within three
years . . . for . . . trespass upon or injury to real property."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1) (2002). Wendy's argues, and the
trial court determined, that because the Drive-Through Facilities
were first constructed in 1982, the alleged trespass is permanent
and Plaintiffs' 2004 trespass claims concerning the Drive-Through
Facilities are therefore time-barred. In response, Plaintiffs
claim that the statute of limitations does not bar their claims
because despite the Drive-Through Facilities' construction in
1982, Wendy's patrons' use of the Drive-Through Facilities and
Wendy's alleged maintenance of landscaping within the facilities
constitute a continuing, rather than a permanent, trespass.

3. Because Wendy's installed the Menu Board Signs in 2003,
Wendy's concedes that if the Menu Board Signs violate the
Declaration, Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim regarding the
Menu Board Signs is not time-barred.
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1(22 As this court recently noted, ff[t]he distinction between a
permanent and continuing trespass in Utah is defined in BreicfQar
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. I", 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d
113 3 ] . "
Sycamore Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 2006 UT App 387,113, 145 P.3d 1177, cert,
denied, 153 P.3d 185 (Utah 2007). In BreicfQar, the Utah Supreme
Court explained:
"When a cause of action for nuisance or
trespass accrues for statute of limitations
purposes depends on whether the nuisance or
trespass is permanent or continuing. Where a
nuisance or trespass is of such character
that it will presumably continue indefinitely
it is considered permanent, and the
limitations period runs from the time the
nuisance or trespass is created. However, if
the nuisance or trespass may be discontinued
at any time it is considered continuing in
character . . . [and] the person injured may
bring successive actions for damages until
the nuisance
[or trespass] is abated . . . ."
2002 UT 53 at i|8 (first and third alteration in original)
(quoting Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1232
(Utah 1995)). In determining whether a trespass is permanent or
continuing, "we look solely to the act constituting the trespass,
and not to the harm resulting from the act." Id. at 1|l0. "Under
this view, the difference between a permanent or continuing
trespass is purely semantic."
Id. at fll. "Once an act of
trespass has occurred, the statute of limitations begins to run."
Id. "If there are multiple acts of trespass, then there are
multiple causes of action, and the statutes of limitations begins
to run anew with each act." Id. Thus, "[w]e characterize a
trespass as 'permanent' to acknowledge that the act or acts of
trespass have ceased to occur [, and w]e characterize a trespass
as 'continuing' to acknowledge that multiple acts of trespass
have occurred, and continue to occur."
Id.
^23 Applying the above analysis, the court in Breigcrar
determined that the defendant's dumping of debris onto the
plaintiff's property constituted a permanent trespass and that
the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the
dumping. See id. at Hl4. The court explained that "[t]he fact
that the pile of debris continued to remain on [the plaintiff's]
property, or the possibility that it could be reasonably abated
is irrelevant to this conclusion."
Id.
1)24 In Sycamore Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., this court considered whether
"underground pipes constitute[d] a continuing trespass because
water and sewage . . . flow through them on a continual basis."
2006 UT App 387 at ^2.
We explained that such a "contention
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require[d the court] to consider the nature of the two components
of the trespass . . . : the pipes themselves and the contents of
the pipes." Id. at 1[4 .
We . . . conclude[d] that the pipes
themselves [were] permanent trespasses
because, far from being an intermittent
invader, they ha[d] been a fixture on the
land for several years, and their
installation amount[ed] to a single act with
a single impact on the land. Although the
water and sewage flowing through the pipes
were not part of the single act of
installation, we conclude[d] that such
contents d[id] not constitute a new trespass.
"The essential element of trespass is
physical invasion of the land," or in other
words, there must be an "encroachment on the
rights of another." Absent an allegation
that the contents of the pipes ha [d] leaked
or otherwise affected the land, the wholly
enclosed contents of the pipes d[id] not
constitute a new encroachment onto the land.
Accordingly, regardless of whether the pipes
[were] empty or full, the encroachment on
[the p]laintiffs' rights to the property
[was] the same.
Id. (citations omitted).
^[2 5 We conclude that, like the pile of rocks in Breigcrar and the
pipes in Sycamore, the act of constructing the Drive-Through
Facilities was permanent in that " [its] installation amount[ed]
to a single act with a single impact on the land."
Id. We
further conclude that each use of the Drive-Through Facilities by
Wendy's patrons does not constitute a new act of trespass
because, like the waste moving through the pipes in Sycamore, the
patrons' alleged encroachment on Plaintiffs' property is "wholly
enclosed" within the Drive-Through Facilities.
Id. Accordingly,
we uphold the trial court's determination that Plaintiffs'
trespass claim regarding the Drive-Through Facilities is timebarred.
%26 We remand, however, the issue of whether the alleged
maintenance of landscaping within the Drive-Through Facilities
and the newly-installed fence constitute new or de minimis
trespasses. The trial court did not address these claims below,
and the record is insufficient for us to decide these issues on
appeal.
III.
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K27 Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in "enjoining
[P]laintiffs from taking any action to inhibit Wendy's from using
and maintaining the Drive[-]Through Facilities." Namely,
Plaintiffs argue that although the statute of limitations may bar
their trespass claim for damages, it does not prevent Plaintiffs
from obtaining equitable relief to remove the trespass from their
property. In raising this issue, Plaintiffs notably fail to cite
any relevant authority to support their position.
f28 Although, "[i]n addition to damages, [a] plaintiff may seek
to stop the conduct that is creating the trespass," and although
"issuance of an injunction to remove the encroachment remains
discretionary with the court," 9 Richard R. Powell, Powell on
Real Property § 64A.05[8] (Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2007), the
question here is whether an equitable remedy of removal is still
available after the statute of limitations has run. The parties
do not cite, and we do not find, any Utah law directly on point.
In at least one state, however, courts have held that requests
for injunctive relief for the removal of permanent trespasses on
property are, like trespass claims, barred by the three-year
statute of limitations. See Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 52-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Troeger v. Fink,
332 P.2d 779, 782, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (stating that "causes
of action for damages and for injunctive relief accrue when the
[permanent] trespass is committed and are barred three years
thereafter" and that " [g]enerally, the running of an applicable
statute of limitations will also bar equitable relief"). 4
^29 This approach makes sense. After all, the three-year
statute of limitations bars any trespass "action." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot
assert the
trespass action that would support their remedy--regardless of
whether that remedy is equitable or is for damages.
^[3 0 Even if this were not the case, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that "[e]quitable claims will be barred after the time fixed
by the analogous statute of limitations unless extraordinary

4. The application of the three-year statute of limitations to
bar removal of the permanent trespass is consistent with the
distinction between a permanent and continuing trespass.
Otherwise, the distinction is without consequence as to the
removal.
5. Notably, the courts in Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E.
Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 1133, and Sycamore
Family, L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. ,
2006 UT App 387, 145 P.3d 1177, gave no indication that equitable
relief to remove the permanent trespass was available to the
property owner after the statute of limitations on the permanent
trespass had run.
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circumstances make the application unjust."
CIG Exploration.
Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37,^11, 24 P.3d 966; see also Hatch v.
Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096, 1101 (1915) ("Generally, in the
state courts, the statute of limitations applies to equitable as
well as legal actions.").
IV.

Additional Trespass and Breach of Contract
Claim Regarding the Alleged New Sign

^31 Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in failing
to consider their trespass and breach of contract claims
concerning the alleged construction of a new sign. We agree and
remand for the trial court to consider this claim. In addressing
this claim, the court will need to consider whether the sign is
permitted under the Declaration. The court will also need to
clarify where the sign is located, as the record is not clear.
V.

Attorney Fees and Costs

H32 In granting summary judgment to Wendy's, the trial court
awarded attorney fees and costs to Wendy's pursuant to the
Declaration. Plaintiffs contest this award, arguing that: even if
Plaintiffs are unsuccessful on all their claims, Wendy's is not
entitled to fees and costs under the language of the Declaration.
We determine the Declaration is ambiguous as to whether the
parties intended the fee provision to apply in the present
circumstances.
1|33 "In Utah, attorney fees cannot be recovered unless
authorized by statute or contract." Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT
44,f22, 100 P.3d 1151. Here, the Declaration provides that:
[i]n the event that legal proceedings are
brought or commenced to enforce any of the
terms of th[e] Declaration against any
[o]wner or other party with an interest in
the Shopping Center, the successful party in
such action shall then be entitled to receive
and shall receive from the defaulting Tolwner
or party a reasonable sum as attorney[] fees
and costs, to be fixed by the court in the
same action.
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs contend that under the Declaration
Wendy's is not entitled to fees and costs because Plaintiffs,
even if unsuccessful in their claims, do not constitute a
defaulting party, and that the contracting parties only intended
the award of fees and costs when the party enforcing the
Declaration is successful in such enforcement. Wendy's disagrees
and instead claims that the contracting parties intended
"defaulting . . . party" to apply more broadly to allow fees in
circumstances such as here where Plaintiffs were dilatory in
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bringing the majority of their claims. We conclude that the
Declaration is unclear as to its terms, see Peterson v. Sunrider
Corp. , 2002 UT 43,1118, 48 P.3d 918, and each party's
interpretation tenable, see Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of
State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990), as to
whether the fee provision applies. We therefore vacate the award
and direct the trial court to determine, before awarding fees and
costs on remand, whether the parties intended the fee provision
to apply in the present circumstances.
CONCLUSION
1134 First, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that
Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of contract claims are timebarred with regard to the Drive-Through Facilities. Second,
because Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Drive-Through Facilities
are time-barred, we affirm the trial court's decision to enjoin
Plaintiffs from taking action to remove the Drive-Through
Facilities. Third, we reverse and remand the trial court's
determination that the Declaration permits the Menu Board Signs.
Fourth, we remand for the trial court to address Plaintiffs'
trespass claims concerning Wendy's alleged maintenance of
landscaping within the Drive-Through Facilities and its purported
installation of a new fence on Plaintiffs' property. Fifth, we
remand for the trial court to consider Plaintiffs' claims
concerning the alleged newly-installed sign. Finally, we vacate
the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs and direct the
court to determine on remand whether the parties intended the fee
provision to apply under the facts of this case.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

K35

WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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